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SOLUTION TO NBA OFFICIATING: I’m serious, this is a game-changer, literally

The solution to the godawful NBA officiating starts with the creation of a complete and completely objective NBA officiating website—details below .  I floated the idea to…a senior-level executive of an NBA team, and he said “great!” but said they couldn’t fund it because it needs to be independent to have validity.  I don’t have the money, time, or the expertise to make this happen, but perhaps some of your readers do—it’s definitely a group project.

The officiating website I envision would be a resource for data without subjective content.  It would therefore *only* include:

Referee calls: video of every call—and every type of call—made by refs of every NBA game, in real speed, and slow motion, from every angle available from broadcasts. (Without audio.)
Statistics: raw data, counting stats—no percentages, ratios, graphs, etc.  Even choosing which metrics to post is subjective.  The site would only provide raw data to give users the means to conduct their own studies.

There would be no commentary, no chat boards, no links, etc.  There would also be no non-calls content.  It won’t be necessary.

If the raw data is available and made easily accessible to site users, fans, students, academic institutions, bloggers, et. al. they will provide the secondary content—the commentary and analysis.  If the site gives them something to work with, they’ll embed the video on their blogs and cite the statistics, and provide the commentary that will spur debate.

Furthermore, non-calls are as important an issue as whistled action, but eventually (and swiftly, I believe) non-call sites will pop up.  Tons will be partisan, but I think you’ll see objective-as-possible Sloan-academic-type sites emerge.  Objective-as-possible non-calls means trying to show all plays of all NBA games that 1) violate rules from the official NBA rulebook (which I believe is also available in video on nba.com) and 2) non-calls can be compared with whistled action from ‘my’ objective officiating site.  The non-calls issue is much more complicated and much more subjective—a longterm project, but the inherent subjectivity is why it must be left to the public, and not appear on the objective officiating site I envision.

I think this site is necessary regardless of the way the NBA league offices handle officiating review, and it’s understandable that the NBA league offices could never produce a site like this, for various reasons, but their infuriating behind-closed-doors policies of dealing with officiating just begs for public response—a cogent, progressive response.  NBA officiating simply *must* be subjected to independent analysis.  And I truly believe the site I propose is the beginning of the solution.  As Justice Brandeis noted: sunlight is the best disinfectant.

So consider just a few aspects of the site’s utility.  Besides all the conspiracy theories and beliefs that refs intentionally favor or seek to harm certain teams, unconscious bias is simply an inherent aspect of the human condition.  However well intentioned these guys are, refs aren’t robots.  But being forced to discover and confront those biases, I like to think refs will likely feel impelled to improve.  And either way, they’ll definitely feel the heat when the whole world can point to objective measurements of their biases.  And who knows, maybe the data will vindicate refs of certain accusations.  And of course, the data won’t just be used to confirm or invalidate popular beliefs about officiating; surely it will elucidate other matters.  For example, I suspect the data will assist in extricating the ‘noise’ from analytical studies of the NBA game.  But yeah, it will also help address accusations of malintent, “Everyone knows that this or that Ref X totally screws this or that team”—fighting, urge, to, use, Spurs, as, completely, randomly, chosen, example.  And my hope beyond hope is that someday, studies of the data and non-calls data will show *definitively* which refs just suck.  Early retirement!

And there are as many other possibilities as there are NBA fans who have the curiosity and creativity to ask questions and the dedication to pursue answers.

Best,

Michael

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That was long enough, but if you want an idea or two of how to get the ball rolling…

Obviously the builders of the site would need to watch every single NBA game each season as the season progresses, record them all, and post and categorize every, every charge, every moving screen, every travel, every palm, even every out-of-bounds.  And yes, they’d even have to watch Pistons games.

Also, it’s quite plausible to start with the ’09-’10 season, though it might take a bit of organizing and persuasion…  I’d contact every team in the league by email and phone, requesting one copy of DVDs of all of that team’s games from the ’09-’10 season.  Consider this idea:

First a polite email is written that 500 fans (or 5,000 fans) electronically sign.  Then a PR rep for each team is contacted at the same time (approximately, no watch synchronizing necessary I think) by phone just to let them know the email is coming, so it doesn’t get lost in the shuffle.  It’s easy to get teams’ PR reps on the phone—I did it with almost every team last season for a project—and their email contact info is available, too.

Then the email is sent with every team carbon copied—and it can be made known, tactfully, that their response will be public: “our 5,000 petitioners eagerly await your reply!”  I don’t even know how much cajoling would be necessary.  I suspect fan-interactive teams like the Mavericks would be happy to send the DVDs (especially considering the umbrage they’ve taken with the quality of officiating), and maybe other metric-centric teams will too.  But if a few teams send the DVDs (maybe even just one team) others might feel compelled to comply with the request.

That may not work, but once the site is established, if it gets serious traffic…well, traffic is everything.  If the site gets big traffic and publicity of any sort, grassroots or otherwise, I imagine it could build the clout to get teams to send DVDs of all games going back 20 years.  How cool would it be to use officiating data to analyze (umm, for someone else to analyze) how the game has changed through the years–that is, as the rules, trends, and basketball culture have changed?

Hey, if you’ve gone all the way through this email, thanks, that’s awesome.  I truly believe that the site I envision could be the beginning of a better League.  If you agree with me, well Mr. Huge Audience Blogger…

Best, again,

Michael

“What’s a fair amount of money to pay the best basketball players in the world? That’s something that would take a team of experts to determine, and even then it would be one part guesswork. Maybe they are paid too much. Maybe they are paid too little. Maybe the owners who lose money are victims of the economy and the cost of international expansion. Maybe they are victims of failing to control their own spending. Maybe the owners have been bleeding cash, and some of the hurt must be passed on to the players. On the other hand maybe it was just a couple of bad years, and this is all a negotiating tactic.”

Abbott wants answers for meaningless questions.  How much should a player make?  What’s fair?  Without a free market a player’s true value cannot be determined.  While there is a salary cap in place, binds on bidding for international players (gee, where does Ricky Rubio play again?), and all those trade restrictions, the value of players is guesswork at best.  (Especially considering that player value is relative to team need—Antwan Jamison represents a huge waste of money for DC but might be of value to Cleveland.)  Trades can also help to correct stupid mistakes by general managers.  Without trade restrictions, players simply move to where they are most valued.  For example, this summer Rudy Gay will be given a maximum salary (mark my words) to be the cornerstone of a franchise.  By the time the current Collective Bargaining Agreement expires in summer ’11 it will have become apparent that Gay can’t do the job and is just costing a team a bunch of money for limited returns.  But to a contender that’s looking for that last piece to put them over the top—the role Richard Jefferson was supposed to play for San Antonio this year—the price might be worth it.

Of course a player’s value isn’t limited to his ability to help his team win games.  It’s not unreasonable for a player’s marketability, among other things, to come into play.  And yeah, that thinking led Memphis to sign Allen Iverson, but that doesn’t mean the idea is invalid.  It just means Memphis Grizzlies management is stupid.  Also, I suspect that since there are merely thirty potential bidders (teams), with disparate spending capabilities and revenue streams, even dissolving restrictions would only give us a good, not great, sense of a player’s value.  If there were a thousand potential bidders, we’d have a more accurate valuation.  (This and the prospect of French cheerleaders are the only points for European expansion.)  But since expansion of any sort isn’t immanent, the best way I can think of to deal with this small v. big market value and ownership means disparity is to impose a powerful revenue sharing system and luxury tax.  How and how much?  I don’t know; I can’t; we can’t.  Abbott says owners are very secretive of their balance sheets.

But whether it’s a two dollars-for-dollar luxury tax or whether taxes and league revenue are distributed on a sliding scale correlating to market size, there’s a way to balance the playing field.  They don’t even need to make these details public; figure out amongst themselves how they want to split up the pot—no one other than team owners care.  Instead, the salary cap, owners/players revenue sharing plan, and other stupid aspects of the CBA makes it seem like there are moral questions to consider, like what percentage of total league revenue is it fair for the players to get.  It’s an utterly meaningless question: players should make whatever the market will bear; the balance sheets of owners are between them and the IRS.  It’s not like this thinking is so radical; Art Modell once said NFL franchise owners were Republicans who vote Socialist.

Why have owners never come up with this step?  Off the top of my head I can think of three quick possibilities:

1) they feel it’s just too complicated (and requires too much effort and annual tinkering) to come up with a tax/revenue sharing system that enables owners with a net worth of $80 million (Peter Holt – San Antonio) to compete with billionaire owners.

2) their claims of losses and hardship are complete bullsh*t and the system currently in place is very beneficial for them.  Or at the very least, the current system isn’t hurting them.  In this case, their labor negotiations are just about making more money—I don’t have a problem with this.

3) they are (as a group) far less intelligent than one might expect from some of the richest people on Earth.  This would indicate that a good number of these owners owe their fortunes to fortune—that they’re just a bunch of lucky bastards.

My guess?  A combo of all three, but more the latter two.  Yes, balancing the playing field might be tricky, but it’s doable.  But more than that, I think some owners are probably doing quite well in this system and have no interest in changing it to benefit their competition.  And there’s no question about the third, at least in some cases.  Some owners are fortunate sons—Charles Dolan’s bills are mostly inherited—and perhaps some are just incredibly lucky, and their wealth isn’t indicative of their business acumen.

Really, I wouldn’t care a wit about this stuff, if it didn’t have a direct impact on the quality of the NBA game.  But it does, and I do.

For one thing, showing losses on your books doesn’t mean your company/business model is failing.  The NBA offices and owners are spending capital to make long-term improvements in the league, and that costs money.  Why is that the concern of the Player’s Association?  It is, sort of, but only because of past blunders.

I don’t know much about common business practices, deals with unions, and such, and I don’t know the details of the NBA’s CBA; but it seems to me that the salary cap is the biggest problem here.  As I see it, it’s not the responsibility of labor to worry about the overall income of the company.  That’s management’s problem.  But in submitting to the owners in previous agreements, accepting a salary cap, they also agreed that that cap would be based on league revenue; the players get 57%.  That doesn’t and never did make any sense to me.  They’re agreeing to receive a percentage of the overall revenue, but they don’t have a say in how the league’s business is conducted, how the owners choose to invest revenue.  Basically, the players allowed themselves to be subject to the ups and downs of the league without getting a seat at the table.  I don’t think having a seat at that table is really anything the players ever wanted, or should want.  Leave the direction of the league to ownership, sure, but players allowing their salaries to be directly tied to the owners decisions about expenditures is just silly.

Now of course employee payroll is always based on the state of the companies for which they work, but not directly, not as a collectively agreed percentage of revenue.  Rather, without a salary cap, the free market would determine the value of a player.  Why not just let supply and demand determine value?  Of course, that an old issue, fifteen years old, to be exact.  Ever since Kevin Garnett signed that immense contract (it was what, $126 million over 7 years?) back in ’95 (I believe) ownership has been loudly freaking out about player salaries.  The real problem there is that owners couldn’t keep other owners from breaking ranks and offering huge salaries without colluding.  But small market teams and owners who are only $100 millionaires, not $800 millionaires or billionaires, didn’t want to compete with Mark Cuban or big market teams.  The answer to this was never to institute a salary cap and unnecessarily entangle league income with player salaries.  The league should have just instituted smarter revenue sharing practices with huge luxury tax penalties.  The luxury taxes are currently dollar for dollar.  Well, go ahead and get rid of the salary cap and require owners to pay $2 for every $1 they go over the luxury tax line.  So when the Knicks spend $100 million and the cap is $50 million, instead of the other owners crying foul, they can just divvy up the $100 million in luxury tax the Knicks will be paying them.

This is way too long already, so I’ll just stop here.  In the end, the labor discussions for the next CBA will probably look like they always do: owners being dishonest about their financial burdens, players being stupid enough to put themselves in a position to be smacked around by ownership.  That Billy Hunter is still the head of the Union ten years after he f#cked up the last CBA indicates how things will turn out this time.

And I wouldn’t give a damn about any of this, except that it directly impacts the quality of play, the quality of talent the teams can put on the floor.

The only thing that would be better than LeBron in New York (other than him being in Houston) would be for him to be in Brooklyn on the Nets, a team with even more money (via Russia w. love) and Beyonce on the sidelines.  Of course, there is no team in Brooklyn, so this would take an incredible leap of faith on LeBron’s part, and wouldn’t really be worth the risk that he end up in NJ for years and years.  No one should have to endure that.

Background

Sure, when Ruben Patterson is released by the Clippers and Rockets fans on clutchfans.net wonder whether it’s a good idea to sign him, well, I generally feel compelled to argue against signing violent sex offenders who get involved in police-horse-punching incidents; but guns in the locker room is just eye-roll inducing stupidity and almost as bad as the socially conscious articles from socially conscious writers that follow.  And also, it involves one of my favorite players (Arenas, not Crittenden) and ruins his comeback from serious injuries.

I just find the whole thing mildly depressing—seriously, power through a few Nicholas Kristof articles and try to tell me this incident is more than “mildly” depressing—and one more thing that sullies this NBA season, along with Tracy McGrady’s tenure with the Rockets ending and Yao Ming making babies instead of game-winners—congrats Yao, and may your first child be a masculine child.

As much as anything (a throwaway phrase I’ve always enjoyed) this incident reminds me of Jayson Williams’ foibles.  No, there’s no comparison between displaying a gun and drunkenly shooting and killing your employee.  But yeah there is, in the same way that there is a perfectly valid comparison between my sex life and Wilt Chamberlain’s.  Arenas and Williams are/were favorite players of mine, as much for their off the court hilariousness as their hardwood successes.  Both f#cked up.  Reading Williams’ classic memoir, Loose Balls, you have to conclude that it was only a matter of time until he went completely nuts with a gun in his hand.  He was a gun toting alcoholic before injury forced him to retire.  After he left the game, Williams just more opportunity to booze and play with guns.  Something was bound to go wrong.  And Arenas?  Until now, Arenas has only been silly nutty, (seemingly) not dangerous nutty.

As for the claim that he welched on a bet with Crittenden, that’s hardly surprising, given what we know of his previous gambling behavior (below).  Now, this clip is hysterical, in part because he’s blatantly cheating, in front of a crowd, and being silly about it—and come on, one millionaire ripping $10K off another millionaire in a (basketball) shooting contest is funny in itself.  And accusations Arenas cheating at Halo* prompted him to spend 2,300 words on nba.com, defending himself.  That’s priceless, and nothing says, “I did it!” like mounting that kind of rambling defense.  But breaking out the guns just spoils the joke.

*[after clicking on the link, search for "don't call me"]

The dude is 36 but he still has the motor to go at top speed for 36 minutes a game and competently defend shooting guards.  And though he doesn’t score much, he’s shooting efficiently.  And when he’s on the floor, the ball movement is terrific.  Whatever the Mavs’ options in a given possession, Kidd will make the most of it.  Unfortunately, the rest of the posse doesn’t do a ton with the opportunities.

Jason Terry can’t shoot straight this year.  I don’t know what’s up with that.  Actually, his three-point shooting has been going downhill the last few years—maybe he lost a half step and doesn’t get quite the same space that he used to get?—but whatever the case, he hasn’t been able to hit the side of a barn this year.  And since like 80% of his value is in his shooting, that’s something of an issue.

Marion is still a good player, but he’s not nearly the big rebounding versatile defending combo forward anymore.  Sure, he’s still got some bounce, but at this point here’s just…good.  And Jason Terry can’t shoot straight this year.  His three-point shooting has been going downhill the last few years.  Whether he’s lost a half step and can’t get the same space to shoot that he used to, I don’t know.  But whatever the case,  he can’t hit the side of a barn this year, and since like 90% of his value is in his shooting, that’s something of an issue.  And then there’s Josh Howard.  Yeah, sure, he’s coming off surgery, will get better, yadda yadda, but even healthy he too is merely a good player.  I note this because in the Mavs’ run to the Finals in ’06 he was terrific and I thought he looked good to stay at that level.  But it didn’t happen.  He shot very well from outside for two years, but he can’t shoot straight anymore either, regardless of his health.

Really, Jose Juan Barea is the only Mavs player other than Dirk who’s having a great year.  He has real value as long as he continues to shoot the lights out and do a decent job of staying in front of point guards.  But it’s not like he’s an up and coming game changer.

I guess I see the Mavericks as contenders by default, merely because neither Denver nor Phoenix are for real.  The Mavs have a decent shot at the Western Conference Finals, I suppose, but that’s their upside.  And the weird thing is, I think of the Mavs as being such a smart franchise, but in a salary cap NBA, flexibility is the truest expression of management smarts (after wins).  But they signed Jason Terry to a butt-ugly that clogs up their cap space for the next few years.  And yeah, Dirk’s a machine, but how long can he do that for another two, three, four years?  Maybe.  Probably not.

Anyway, hereafter I will refer to the Memphis Grizzlies as the Memphis Blues.

NBA VIEW: Memphis Blues

The Memphis Blues look like they’re really going somewhere, but it’s illusory.  And it’s not because Rudy Gay is signing with someone else this summer, (though he will).  A team can’t go anywhere giving a ton of money to a guy who doesn’t pass or play defense.  And all the “he’s still young” stuff doesn’t float.  In his fourth year, Gay still doesn’t defend and misses being the least willing passer on his team only because he plays with the least willing passer in the league: Zach Randolph.  And do you really see progress with his offense?  I see a few more shots falling for him.  Is he going to the rim more often?  I’d like to know, because that would be an indication of progress, but NBA’s hotspots isn’t working for me now.  Whatever the case, Gay is a faulty foundation; better to live in a tent.

I really do have a hard time seeing upside in a team that doesn’t pass.  Marc Gasol just might be a big time player, and he can only get off 9 shots a game playing with these guys.  OJ Mayo certainly isn’t big time.  I think he can be a good player on a good team, but I’ve never seen much upside in him; being a bit short and not killer quick, he just has to work too hard for his shots.  This spring make sure to watch a Memphis/Portland game and compare Mayo to Travis Outlaw (who’s injured for another few months).  Mayo has tons more game, lots of skills, but he has to because he’s at a physical disadvantage.  Outlaw only has one move, a pull-up jumper off a dribble or two.  But he’s tall, has long arms, and jumps through the roof; he can always always get off a clean look.

The future of the team is Marc Gasol, which makes it kind of awkward that they just drafted their center of the future, Hasheem Thabeet.  Ugh, why couldn’t they have drafted Ricky Rubio?  It’s not like Memphis is going to be in the playoffs anytime soon.  And Rubio is going to be terrific.  I’m not saying that Thabeet isn’t going to be good.  I have no idea, but nobody else does either.  And by the time we do, he’ll be finishing his rookie contract.  Basically, Memphis had to decide whether to bet on Gasol or bet on Mike Conley Jr.  They went with Conley, and they bet wrong.  I can’t give them too much crap about it.  Gasol was fat and turns 25 in a few weeks.  Conley is not fat, three years younger, and might be learning to shoot, finally.  Who knew that drafting Thabeet would light a fire under Gasol’s ass?  It did though; Gasol lost a lot of weight of the summer and is considerably quicker.  I think he’s a star.

Memphis has played Gasol and Thabeet together on the floor at times season, figuring that since the team wasn’t playing defense anyway, why not?  I don’t argue against it.  The two of them playing together, however unlikely to work, is putting their future on the floor.  They should drafted Rubio.  They should have watched the Olympics like everyone else and drafted him.  Who cares that he’s playing in Spain for another year or two or three?  In that time, he will improve on someone else’s dollar, and then come to play in the NBA on his rookie contract.  By that time Gasol will make $10 million+ a year, and Thabeet will be looking for his.  Good luck.

I always wondered about Aaron Brooks’ upside, because I couldn’t think of anyone Brooks’ size who could finish at the rim consistently—ever—other than Allen Iverson.  I figured, nearly every shot he takes within 15 feet of the rim is going to be heavily contested for the rest of his career.  And that meant he’d have to consistently shoot over 40% from 3 to be a starter in this league.  So far I’ve been quite happily wrong about Brooks.  But I think my reasoning was sound, in general, and it’s part of the reason the Thunder have such upside on defense.  Four of their five starters (excluding the unfortunate looking Nenad Kristic) are extremely long-limbed and very athletic.  When they’re active, nearly ever shot the opposition takes is heavily contested.  Like the way people talk about shot-blocking centers “changing” more shots than they block, I think the physical advantages of those four players makes every shot the opposition take just a little bit harder.

They’re still putting it together: they turn the ball over a lot; their starting backcourt shoots terribly; their starting center is Nenad Kristic.  (Why not just shave your head and be done with it?)  But they should only get better.  Well, I don’t think Russell Westbrook is going to learn to shoot anytime soon.  He’s one of those guys who’s going to need a thousand shots a day in the offseason to figure out how to get the ball in the hoop.  But James Harden’s improving shooting and Thabo Sefolosha’s finishing inside are a nice mix at shooting guard.  As Harden earns more minutes, Kevin Durant finds his stroke from three (any day now) they will be a more dangerous offensive team.  If Jeff Green can find a middle ground between last year’s outstanding shooting and this year’s godawful shooting, they can be very dangerous.  They’re a starting center and a year of development away from being a second round team, maybe better.   Most important of all, they’re my second favorite team to watch.

They decided not to trade Raef Lafrentz’s expiring contract, and I said good show.  If you don’t get the right deal, sit on it, let the contract expire, and take the cap relief to use later.  They did and then they panicked.  The two best moves made by the Trailblazers over the summer were made by the Raptors and the Jazz.  The Raptors saved the Trailblazers from stupidly signing Hedo Turkoglu to a silly contract—by themselves signing Hedo to a silly contract.  Then the Jazz saved the Trailblazers from stupidly signing a really good player, Paul Millsap, who didn’t fit Portland at all—the Jazz signed Millsap instead to a contract that may or may not be silly.  They were saved twice!  And they responded by signing Andre Miller, another good player who doesn’t fit their team at all.

I’ve written about that plenty, so I won’t go on about it, but it’s the panic that bothered me so much.  Why panic for no reason?  Do you HAVE to spend the money?  Can’t you just chill out and hold on to the cap space and bide your time until the right player comes along?  Instead they signed Miller because they had to sign someone.  As it happened, they signed Miller to a perfectly good contract.  So now that the experiment has failed, it seems to me that it shouldn’t be terribly hard to move him—because he will be good, just for some other team.

Finally, with Greg Oden going down for the season, the Trailblazers have reason to panic.  Congratulations!

Without Oden, they’re a second round team at best—and I don’t see them making it that far.  Ironically, Millsap would be a nice fit for this team, now.  Lamarcus Aldridge could play his baby’s-bottom-soft game at center, while Millsap played the manly power-forward, and Joel Przybilla could come in and spell Aldridge when he was…too soft.  I tell you, sometimes I think Aldridge is a bigger taller Charles Smith.  Hopefully I’m wrong.  And hopefully Greg Oden comes back bionic.