After all, even if they had been terrifically lucky with injuries, New Jersey was going to lose a lot of games this season: their roster is dreadful.  The best coaching imaginable isn’t going to make an all-star out of Trent Hassell or make 35-year-old journeyman Yi Jianlian young again (though some have tried); the Nets were positively destined to be lottery fodder.  And of course they’ve actually been atrociously unlucky with injuries.  Devin Harris played gimpy for the first two games of the season before missing ten of the next (and Frank’s last) fourteen games.  Without Harris, the Nets are not-yet-star Brook Lopez, a swiftly improving Chris Douglas-Roberts, and a bunch of kids (who play like kids) and scrubs.  And apart from Lopez, only Josh Boone (5 shots per game) is shooting over 45%.

Actually, the only advantage the Nets typically enjoy is that Lopez’s unusually good handle and ability to finish with either hand makes him very effective from the high-post, and he regularly gets a step on big defenders who aren’t comfortable that far from the basket.  Since Harris’ replacement, Rafer Alston, is utterly incapable of penetrating, Frank frequently ran the offense through Lopez, and despite an inevitable increase in turnovers, Lopez has largely done an admirable job.  Considering that big men operating on the high-post is almost as unusual to see as a sky hook, you have to give Frank some credit for creatively utilizing the only mismatch on the roster.  Regardless, given their paucity of developed talent, the Nets were going to do a lot of losing this season, whether they were coached by Lawrence Frank or Phil Jackson, (not that Jackson would deign to coach a team with fewer than two established stars.)  Because this was so clear and predicted by everyone, I thought Frank had a real shot to make it through the losing streak.

Also, having a roster without (developed) talent is an inevitable byproduct of the house-cleaning and talent restocking that the Nets have been working on for the last few years.  Yes, they’re awful this year, but in the big picture, the Nets are exactly where they need to be, as I recently pointed out.  All through the time they were shedding very good but expensive players from their roster, they kept Frank at the helm.  So why ax him now?  And what do they do for the rest of the season?  What high quality coach is going to take on a team that’s going to lose 60–70 games this season?  Unless they give Hubie Brooks or Doug Collins a pile of money to come out of retirement for the rest of the season, the Nets will have to hope they stumble upon another wunderkind—as Frank was widely dubbed when he became the Nets head coach at 33 and led the team to 13 straight wins.  I mention that early praise because, with respect to Frank, that initial 13–game sample made him a wunderkind as much as the 0–17 start this season made him a failure; both were overreactions to a small sample of Frank’s work.  The latter overreaction comes from Rod Thorn, a man who does so much right and so much wrong.

Indeed, this firing reminds me that Thorn is one of the best and most godawful GMs in the league—only Danny Ainge compares.   Thorn built a contender out of very little, but then he held on for too long, when the window had clearly closed.  In particular, the pressured re-signing of Vince Carter put them in a serious bind for the future.  However, in just two years Thorn turned Carter, Jason Kidd, and Richard Jefferson into Devin Harris, kids on rookie contracts, an old man from China, and expiring contracts that will give the Nets the most cap space in the league for this summer’s outstanding free agent class.  On the other hand, with few exceptions, Thorn has drafted utter CBA-level stiffs.  (Seriously, you almost wish that Thorn would make Isiah Thomas his head talent scout—but with no authority to make decisions.)

But what really bugs me about the Frank firing is that I don’t think it was a tactical decision; the players never quit on Frank, and he’s always been a capable Xs and Os guy.  Instead, I think Thorn fired Frank because that’s just what you do when your team loses a bunch.  You fire the coach.  You just do, period.  That it’s protocol doesn’t make it less stupid, and it recalls the same thinking that led Thorn to re-sign Vince Carter.  That’s just what you do when your star player’s contract ends.  You re-sign him.  You just do it, period.  And though re-signing Carter wasn’t quite stupid—he was still an all-star level guy—it was clearly the wrong move in the big picture; it showed a lack of patience, vision, and creativity (they couldn’t have found a sign-and-trade partner?)  Firing Frank, on the other hand, shows a lack of gumption.  I might have also put it, “lack of grace under fire,” but come on, who was calling for Frank’s head?  Who was calling for Thorn’s?  I should note the very legitimate possible caveat: it might have come from ownership.  But I sure didn’t see any pressure in the papers or on the TV.  And it’s not like Nets fans were chanting for Frank to be fired—though that’s mostly because there are no Nets fans.

In the end though, the Nets probably won’t pay for their dumb decision; because this season is practically irrelevant to them.  It was inevitable that they were going to be lousy this year, and it’s almost inevitable that they are going to get much, much better in the near future.  Provided the Nets are careful with Harris, he should be fine in the long run, Lopez will get better and better, and it would literally be difficult for the Nets to come out of this summer without at least one legit star from free agency.  Add the 10% chance that Rod Thorn doesn’t screw up their imminent top four lottery pick too badly, and the Nets should be serious contenders within three years.  Lawrence Frank deserved a shot with that team.  But who knows, maybe they draft right, hire Jeff Van Gundy, and I never say another bad thing about Rod Thorn.  I hope so, because I’m not a Nets fan, but I do live in Brooklyn, and I like a good show.

I’ve read so much about the great television commentary chemistry between best buddies Jeff Van Gundy and Mark Jackson, and nothing about the fact that Jackson is terrible.  He’s just an awful commentator.  The plodding monotone delivery might not so unbearable if he didn’t call games like he used to play defense: slowly, passively, telegraphing every movement, lacking the ability to change direction.  He’s worse than Bill Walton, because at least Bill Walton sucks uniquely.  Jackson makes only the most obvious comments, which normally have something to do with Kobe just being Kobe because that’s what Kobe does, because he’s a superstar, because he’s the best player in the world, just being Kobe, doing what he does.  The ever-steady flow of platitudes is only occasionaly interupted by him saying you have to keep your hands up on defense.  (That’s literally everything he knows about playing defense.)  So here’s hoping Jackson knocks em dead in the interview.  Make it happen, Mark.

He notes that the Celtics had an extraordinary offensive rebounding edge over the Lakers in the Finals and wondered “whether Lakers’ low number of offensive rebounds was just a matter of bad luck.” This comment assumes that getting offensive rebounds is valuable, and an important factor in teams’ success.

Offensive rebounds, he notes, account for about 30% of missed shots in the NBA, and even without fancy schmancy research “simple rebound rates can let us see things about the game for the first time.”

What things? More importantly, what’s the significance of these…things?

Ayres goes on:

OK, so what? Not that it’s relevant to this discussion (it’s not) but Philly and Miami were both crappy teams.

“Almost a 10 percent difference in getting the ball back when you miss can have a huge impact on games.”

Yeah? Prove it.

“2. Rebound rates give you a better sense of who are the best individual rebounders. During the playoffs, Tim Duncan had the most defensive rebounds per game“

This is incorrect. Rebound rates simply show who collected the most rebounds per game/minute, not who is best at rebounding.

“3. Finally, rebound rates show that the art of the offensive rebound is distinctly different than the art of the defensive rebound. Camby and Duncan, for example, rank only 35th and 21st among players in the playoffs in terms of offensive rebound probabilities.”

This is also fallacious. With the exception of freethrow shooting—isolated occurrences with universal conditions for all players—individual player statistics are highly influenced by context and can give you, at best, an indication of players’ talents. These statistics are often misleading without context and are never conclusive.

That the Celtics out-offensive-rebounded the Lakers in the Finals is not an indication that offensive rebounds are particularly valuable, nor that attacking the offensive glass is a strategy for success. Many coaches (like coach…me, and Jeff Van Gundy too, I think) deemphasize offensive rebounds, in order to get their defense set up and avoid giving up easy transition baskets. In fact, if you check out the stats, year after year, it seems pretty evident that there is no correlation between offensive rebounds and success.

For what it’s worth (nothing) on their way to a championship, the Boston Celtics ranked 23rd in offensive boards this season.